

# Vector discrete problems: parametrization of an optimality principle and conditions of solvability in the class of algorithms involving linear convolution of criteria

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## Abstract

An  $n$ -criteria problem with a finite set of vector valuations is considered. An optimality principle of this problem is given by an integer-valued parameter  $s$ , which is varied from 1 to  $n-1$ . At that, the majority and Pareto optimality principles correspond to the extreme values of the parameter. Sufficient conditions, under which the problem of finding efficient valuations corresponding to the parameter  $s$  is solvable by the linear convolution of criteria, are indicated.

## 1 Basic definitions and lemma

As usually [1], let a vector function

$$y = (y_1(x), y_2(x), \dots, y_n(x)) : X \rightarrow \mathbf{R}^n, \quad n \geq 2,$$

be defined on a set of alternatives  $X$ .

When choosing an optimal alternative from the set  $X$  it is enough to consider the set of feasible valuations

$$Y = \{y \in \mathbf{R}^n : y = y(x), x \in X\}.$$

Here  $\mathbf{R}^n$  is the  $n$ -dimensional criteria space. We consider a vector problem

$$y \rightarrow \min_{y \in Y}$$

and suppose  $Y$  to be a finite set containing  $|Y| \geq 2$  elements. This problem is naturally called discrete.

A mechanism of choosing an optimal valuation is usually based on a binary relation expressing “preference” of a valuation to another [1–6]. In its turn, any binary relation generates an optimality principle [6–8].

In this paper we continue our research of solvability conditions of vector discrete problems of finding the Pareto set in the class of algorithms involving linear convolution of criteria (see [9,10]). This time we consider the case of the parametrization of an optimality principle.

For a vector  $z = (z_1, z_2, \dots, z_n) \in \mathbf{R}^n$  we denote

$$(z)^+ = |\{i \in N_n : z_i > 0\}|,$$

$$(z)^- = |\{i \in N_n : z_i < 0\}|,$$

where  $N_n = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ .

For any number  $s \in N_{n-1}$  we define the binary relation

$$y' \prec_s y'' \iff s(y' - y'')^+ < (y' - y'')^-$$

in the criteria space  $\mathbf{R}^n$ . By that, the valuation  $y'$  is preferred to the valuation  $y''$  by the binary relation  $\prec_s$  if and only if the number of criteria, by which  $y'$  is “preferred” to  $y''$ , is more than  $s$  times greater than the number of criteria, by which  $y''$  is “preferred” to  $y'$ .

For any subscript  $s \in N_{n-1}$  we also introduce the set of  $s$ -efficient valuations  $C_s^n(Y)$  by setting

$$C_s^n(Y) = \{y \in Y : \gamma_s(y) = \emptyset\},$$

where  $\gamma_s(y) = \{y' \in Y : y' \prec_s y\}$ .

It is obvious that the set  $C_s^n(Y)$  can be defined as follows:

$$y \in C_s^n(Y) \iff \forall y' \in Y (s(y' - y)^+ \geq (y' - y)^-). \quad (1)$$

Therefore  $C_s^n(Y) \subseteq C_k^n(Y)$  for any  $1 \leq s < k \leq n - 1$ .

It is clear that the set  $C_1^n(Y)$  coincides with the set of majority efficient valuations defined in [4,11–13]:

$$M^n(Y) = \{y \in Y : \mu(y) = \emptyset\},$$

where  $\mu(y) = \{y' \in Y : \sum_{i=1}^n \text{sign}(y_i - y'_i) > 0\}$ . The majority optimality principle realizes the procedure of making decision by the majority of voices.

It is easy to check that a valuation  $y$  is Pareto optimal if and only if the inequality  $(y - y')^- \geq 1$  is true for any valuation  $y' \neq y$ . Hence, taking into account the obvious inequality  $(y - y')^+ \leq n - 1$ , we obtain that the set  $C_{n-1}^n(Y)$  is the Pareto set defined as follows:

$$P^n(Y) = \{y \in Y : \pi(y) = \emptyset\},$$

where  $\pi(y) = \{y' \in Y : y - y' \geq 0, y \neq y'\}$ .

Thus the following lemma is valid.

**Lemma.** *For any number  $n \geq 2$  the relations*

$$M^n(Y) = C_1^n(Y) \subseteq C_2^n(Y) \subseteq \dots \subseteq C_{n-1}^n(Y) = P^n(Y)$$

*hold.*

From the lemma it follows that  $M^2(Y) = P^2(Y)$ .

So any parameter  $s \in N_{n-1}$  defines the set of  $s$ -efficient valuations of a  $n$ -criteria discrete problem.

## 2 Example

The following example shows that the sets  $C_1^n(Y), C_2^n(Y), \dots, C_{n-1}^n(Y)$  can be nonempty and distinct, i.e. any  $C_k^n(Y)$  can be a proper subset of the set  $C_{k+1}^n(Y)$  for any number  $k \in N_{n-2}$ .

**Example.** Let  $Y = \{y^{(1)}, y^{(2)}, \dots, y^{(n-1)}\}, n \geq 3$ , where

$$y^{(1)} = (1, 0, 0, \dots, 0)$$

$$y^{(i)} = (0, 0, \dots, 0, \underbrace{n-i, n-i, \dots, n-i}_{i \text{ times}}) \in \mathbf{R}^n, \quad i = 2, 3, \dots, n-1;$$

i.e. the valuation  $y^{(i)}$  is the  $(n-i)$ -th row of the following matrix of the dimension  $(n-1) \times n$ :

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 2 & 2 & \dots & 2 & 2 & 2 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 3 & \dots & 3 & 3 & 3 \\ & & & & \dots & & & \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & n-2 & n-2 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Let us show that the equality

$$C_s^n(Y) = \{y^{(1)}, y^{(2)}, \dots, y^{(s)}\} \quad (2)$$

holds for any  $s \in N_{n-1}$ , i.e.

$$\emptyset \neq C_1^n(Y) \subset C_2^n(Y) \subset \dots \subset C_{n-1}^n(Y).$$

We prove inequality (2) by induction.

First of all, equality (2) is evident for  $s = 1$  since the relation

$$y^{(1)} \prec_1 y^{(i)}, \quad i = 2, 3, \dots, n-1$$

is true.

So  $C_1^n(Y) = \{y^{(1)}\}$ .

Further on, suppose that (2) is valid for  $s = k-1$ . Then let us show that

$$C_k^n(Y) = \{y^{(1)}, y^{(2)}, \dots, y^{(k)}\} = C_{k-1}^n(Y) \cup \{y^{(k)}\}.$$

On account of the lemma ( $C_{k-1}^n(Y) \subseteq C_k^n(Y)$ ) and definition (1), it is sufficient to prove that the inequality

$$k(y^{(i)} - y^{(k)})^+ \geq (y^{(i)} - y^{(k)})^- \quad (3)$$

holds for any subscript  $i \in N_{n-1}$ .

Consider two cases.

Case 1.  $i > k$ . It is easy to see that

$$(y^{(i)} - y^{(k)})^- = k, \quad (y^{(i)} - y^{(k)})^+ = i - k.$$

Consequently, inequality (3) holds.

Case 2.  $i < k$ . If  $i = 1$ , then

$$(y^{(1)} - y^{(k)})^- = k, (y^{(1)} - y^{(k)})^+ = 1.$$

Thus inequality (3) is true.

If  $1 < i < k$ , then it can be easily seen that

$$(y^{(i)} - y^{(k)})^- = k - i, (y^{(i)} - y^{(k)})^+ = i.$$

Consequently, inequality (3) is valid.

### 3 Solvability conditions

From now on put

$$\Lambda^n(Y) = \bigcup_{\lambda \in \Lambda_n} \Lambda^n(Y, \lambda),$$

$$\Lambda^n(Y, \lambda) = \arg \min \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i y_i : y \in Y \right\},$$

$$\Lambda_n = \left\{ \lambda \in R^n : \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i = 1, \lambda_i > 0, i \in N_n \right\}.$$

The Pareto set  $P^n(Y)$  is widely known [1] to contain the set  $\Lambda^n(Y)$ . The problem of finding the Pareto set is said to be solvable in the class of algorithms involving linear convolution of criteria if the inclusion

$$P^n(Y) \subseteq \Lambda^n(Y)$$

holds. The interest to the problem of solvability (see for instance [14–21]) can be explained by the fact that the inclusion above reveals the possibility to use scalar optimization methods in vector optimization.

Now we formulate and prove a sufficient solvability condition of the problem of finding the set  $C_s^n(Y)$  of a vector discrete problem.

Set

$$\mathbf{R}_+^n = \{y \in Y : y_i \geq 0, i \in N_n\}.$$

From now on, for any vector  $z = (z_1, z_2, \dots, z_n) \in \mathbf{R}^n$  we denote

$$N_n^+(z) = \{i \in N_n : z_i > 0\},$$

$$N_n^-(z) = \{i \in N_n : z_i < 0\}.$$

$$N_n^0(z) = \{i \in N_n : z_i = 0\}.$$

**Theorem.** Let  $Y \subset \mathbf{R}_+^n$ ,  $2 \leq |Y| < \infty$ ,  $s \in N_{n-1}$  and the formula

$$\forall i \in N_n \ (y_i < y'_i \implies (s+1)y_i \leq y'_i) \quad (4)$$

holds for any valuations  $y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n) \in Y$  and  $y' = (y'_1, y'_2, \dots, y'_n) \in Y$ . Then for any  $i \in N_s$  the inclusion

$$C_i^n(Y) \subseteq \Lambda^n(Y)$$

is true, i.e. the problem of finding the set of  $i$ -efficient solutions is solvable in the class of algorithms involving linear convolution of criteria

Proof. Let  $s \in N_{n-1}$ . According to the lemma, the theorem will be proved if we show that

$$C_s^n(Y) \subseteq \Lambda^n(Y).$$

Let  $y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n) \in C_s^n(Y)$ . Consider the vector  $\lambda$  with the coordinates

$$\lambda_i = \frac{L}{\zeta_i}, \quad i \in N_n, \quad (5)$$

where

$$L = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n 1/\zeta_i},$$

$$\zeta_i = \begin{cases} y_i & \text{if } i \in N_n^+(y), \\ \gamma/s & \text{if } i \notin N_n^+(y), \end{cases}$$

$$\gamma = \min\{y'_i : y' \in Y, i \in N_n^+(y')\}. \quad (6)$$

It is easy to check that  $\lambda \in \Lambda_n$  since the existence of  $\gamma$  is guaranteed by the conditions  $|Y| \geq 2$  and  $Y \subset \mathbf{R}_+^n$ .

Let us show that the inequality

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i y'_i \geq \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i y_i \quad (7)$$

holds for any  $y' \in Y$ . To do this, we partition the set  $Y$  into two disjoint subsets

$$Y_1 = \{y' \in Y : \forall i \in N_n (y_i \leq y'_i)\},$$

$$Y_2 = \{y' \in Y : \exists i \in N_n (y_i > y'_i)\}.$$

It is easy to see that inequality (7) holds for any valuation  $y' \in Y_1$ .

Let  $y' \in Y_2$ . Then it is evident that  $N_n^-(y' - y) \neq \emptyset$ , and the set  $N_n^+(y' - y)$  is nonempty since  $y \in C_s^n(Y)$ . Therefore

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i (y'_i - y_i) = \sum_{i \in N_n^-(y' - y)} \lambda_i (y'_i - y_i) + \sum_{j \in N_n^+(y' - y)} \lambda_j (y'_j - y_j). \quad (8)$$

On account of (5), we have

$$\sum_{i \in N_n^-(y' - y)} \lambda_i (y'_i - y_i) \geq - \sum_{i \in N_n^-(y' - y)} \lambda_i y_i = -L(y' - y)^-. \quad (9)$$

Let us estimate the second summand of the right part of (8).

Let  $j \in N_n^+(y' - y)$ . Then the following two cases are possible.

Case 1.  $j \in N_n^+(y)$ . By (4) we obtain  $y'_j - y_j \geq s y_j$ . Taking into account (1) and the obvious inequality  $(y' - y)^+ > 0$ , we deduce

$$\lambda_j (y'_j - y_j) \geq \lambda_j s y_j \geq L \frac{(y' - y)^-}{(y' - y)^+}. \quad (10)$$

Case 2.  $j \notin N_n^+(y)$ . Then  $j \in N_n^0(y)$ . By (1) we obtain

$$\lambda_j (y'_j - y_j) = \lambda_j y'_j = L s \frac{y'_j}{\gamma} \geq L \frac{y'_j (y' - y)^-}{\gamma (y' - y)^+}. \quad (11)$$

As  $j \in N_n^+(y' - y)$  we have  $y'_j > y_j = 0$ . Consequently, by (6) the inequality  $y'_j \geq \gamma$  holds. Thus, from (11) we obtain (10) once again. Therefore

$$\sum_{j \in N_n^+(y' - y)} \lambda_j (y'_j - y_j) \geq L(y' - y)^-.$$

From this by (8) and (9) we have

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i (y'_i - y_i) \geq 0.$$

Thereby the inequality (7) holds for any valuation  $y' \in Y_2$ .

Summarizing what has been already proved, we see that  $C_s^n(Y) \subseteq \Lambda^n(Y)$ .

The theorem has been proved.

The following known results follow from the theorem.

**Corollary 1** [9]. *Let  $Y \subset \mathbf{R}_+^n$  and the formula*

$$\forall y, y' \in Y \forall i \in N_n (y_i < y'_i \implies ny_i \geq y'_i)$$

*holds. Then  $P^n(Y) \subseteq \Lambda^n(Y)$ .*

**Corollary 2** [10]. *Let  $Y \subset \mathbf{R}_+^n$  and the formula*

$$\forall y, y' \in Y \forall i \in N_n (y_i < y'_i \implies 2y_i \geq y'_i)$$

*be true. Then  $M^n(Y) \subseteq \Lambda^n(Y)$ .*

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